Exposing Why Farmers Can't Legally Replant Their Own Seeds
Veritasium traces how Monsanto came to own more than 80% of US seeds, starting from the 1942 discovery of the selective herbicides 2,4-D and 2,4,5-T and the dioxin contamination the company hid from its own poisoned workers and from Agent Orange in Vietnam. It explains the chemistry of glyphosate and Roundup, then how Monsanto fired a salmonella resistance gene into crops with a gene gun to create patented Roundup Ready seeds it could legally stop farmers from replanting. The film documents the enforcement machine of private detectives, the 1-800-ROUNDUP hotline, and over 400 lawsuits, then the 2015 IARC cancer ruling that unlocked the Monsanto Papers showing buried tumor data and ghostwritten safety studies. It ends with Bayer's acquisition, the $289 million Dewayne Johnson verdict, over $10 billion in settlements, and the lesson of what happens when industry captures the science meant to regulate it.
Published Aug 31, 202546:58 video33 min readAdded Jun 16, 2026Open on YouTube →
At a glance
This is the story of how one company came to own more than 80% of the seeds planted in the United States, and what it did to get there. Veritasium opens on a murder, an Arkansas farmer shot dead in 2016 over a herbicide, and uses it as the door into Monsanto: the chemistry of the weed killers it sold, the dioxin it knew was poisoning its workers and stayed quiet about, the Agent Orange it shipped to Vietnam, the discovery of glyphosate and the Roundup empire built on it, the genetic engineering trick that let it patent living seeds, and the legal machine it used to sue hundreds of farmers for replanting them. It is three videos in one: organic chemistry told atom by atom, a corporate history that runs from a 1942 poison ivy experiment to a $10 billion settlement, and a hard look at how a company captured the science meant to regulate it.
The film is explicit that its investigation rests on publicly available documents, recordings, and third party opinions, all sources linked in the original description. This page is a remake, not a recap. It walks the same path the video walks, in the same order, keeping the molecules, the dates, the named people, the court awards, and the numbers intact. Read it and you have watched the video.
An unusual enemy: how a poison ivy problem became a weed killer
In 1942 a chemist named Franklin D. Jones made an unusual enemy: poison ivy. His children reacted violently to the plant, breaking out in rashes and swelling whenever they brushed against it, so Jones wanted a way to kill it. He sprayed the ivy with hormones, chemicals that regulate a plant's functions the way hormones do in animals, hoping one would make it die. Most did nothing. Some made the ivy grow better. Then one day certain samples turned autumn colors far too early, twisted into strange shapes, and within days shriveled and died. The chemical responsible was a growth hormone called 2,4-D.
The molecule is a benzene ring, six carbons and hydrogens, with an acid tail and two chlorine atoms in the 2 and 4 positions of the ring, which is where the name comes from. Jones realized the synthetic hormone was incredibly potent. A tiny amount still encouraged growth, but a heavy dose triggered such uncontrollable, unsustainable growth that the plant killed itself. As Derek Muller's guest puts it, he had made plant cancer in a bottle.
What made it valuable was its pickiness. The grass around the ivy was barely touched, as if resistant. Over two years Jones ran more than a hundred experiments and found 2,4-D killed broad leaved weeds like dandelions, chickweed, and poison ivy but virtually ignored wheat, corn, and barley, because those are all species of grass. To sharpen the effect he tested relatives and found that adding a third chlorine to the ring, making 2,4,5-T, left grasses even more unscathed. This was a genuine breakthrough. Until then a farmer fighting weeds had two options: spray something brutal like arsenic, or pull the weeds out by hand. With 2,4-D and 2,4,5-T you could spray an entire field and only the weeds would die. Jones had the first practically viable selective herbicides, and he patented them in 1945 as the war was ending.
Figure 1. The chemistry that started everything. 2,4-D is a benzene ring carrying two chlorines and an acid tail; adding a third chlorine makes 2,4,5-T. Both are synthetic growth hormones that throw broad leaved weeds into fatal runaway growth while leaving grasses like wheat, corn, and barley untouched, the first selective herbicides a farmer could spray across an entire crop field.
After the Allied victory the wartime patent secrecy lifted, and it turned out other scientists in the US and the UK had found the same herbicides independently. The market filled with modern miracle weed killers, Weedone, Weed-A-Bomb, Endo-Weed, all formulations of 2,4-D and 2,4,5-T. They replaced the hoe on farm fields, railroad tracks, and sidewalks, and they gave America the perfect green lawn of grass and nothing else. By the late 1940s herbicides were roughly a $10 million industry, and everyone wanted in, including one of the biggest chemical companies of the day, Monsanto.
Monsanto's secret poison problem: the Nitro explosion and dioxin
One of Monsanto's main herbicide factories sat in Nitro, West Virginia, pumping out almost a ton of 2,4,5-T a day. By 1949 business was booming when the plant exploded. More than a hundred workers ran out to watch a dark cloud rise 40 meters above the factory, then a black, stinking powder rained down on their faces. Within hours men fell ill: first headaches and nausea, then their skin erupted with bumps, pustules, and acne. The lesions got so bad that Monsanto's on site doctors peeled off layers of skin trying to remove them. The doctors noted a strong odor when the men were together in a closed room and wrote that they believed the workers were excreting a foreign chemical through their skin. Nobody at Monsanto knew what it was, because both 2,4,5-T and 2,4-D were marketed as very safe. Jones himself had remarked that people accidentally drank or sprayed the herbicides on themselves with no ill effects, and one doctor of the era bragged that he had personally taken half a gram of pure 2,4-D a day for three weeks and invited you to judge the results.
Monsanto analyzed its ingredients, found no culprit, and effectively stopped looking. Conditions at the plant stayed the same and the company gave workers a choice: keep working with 2,4,5-T, or take the gate. In a town with hardly any other jobs that was no choice, so most stayed, and something inside the factory kept poisoning them for years.
The answer came in 1957, eight years later, from a German dermatologist named Karl Schulz, who was treating patients with the same lesions, many of them from 2,4,5-T factories around Hamburg. When he tested the listed ingredients on rabbit ears in his lab, he got no reaction, which puzzled him. The reason is in the synthesis. To make 2,4,5-T you start with tetrachlorobenzene, a benzene ring with four chlorine atoms. Those chlorines are highly electronegative and pull on the ring's shared electron cloud, leaving the carbons slightly positive and the chlorines slightly negative. Heat it with sodium hydroxide and a negative hydroxide ion binds to a slightly positive carbon, forcing out a chlorine to take its place. That produces trichlorophenol (TCP), a key intermediate. Hold the reaction at 170 degrees Celsius, grow the oxygen tail into an acid, and you get 2,4,5-T. On paper none of those ingredients explains the eruptions.
But Schulz suspected the conditions were not perfect. If the temperature runs even a few degrees above 170 degrees Celsius, there is suddenly enough energy for two molecules of TCP to fuse, creating a molecule commonly known as dioxin, specifically TCDD. It forms only in trace amounts, maybe one or two dioxin molecules per hundred thousand molecules of 2,4,5-T, small enough to seem harmless. Schulz tested it anyway. He took TCP contaminated with trace dioxin, rubbed it into his own skin, and got the same acne as the Nitro workers. He immediately contacted Germany's big chemical producers, and one German company sent letters to both Monsanto and Dow warning that the acne came from dioxin byproducts, naming exactly when in the process the contamination happened and how to prevent it. Monsanto denied ever getting the letters; Dow said it misfiled them. Either way both companies knew something in 2,4,5-T was poisoning their workers, and Monsanto did not warn the public, perhaps because the herbicides were about to make a fortune.
Figure 2. Why the workers got sick. The intended path runs tetrachlorobenzene to TCP to 2,4,5-T at a controlled 170 degrees Celsius. Let the temperature drift a few degrees higher and two TCP molecules fuse into dioxin, a trace contaminant at one to two molecules per hundred thousand that Dow itself would later call the most toxic compound it had ever experienced. Monsanto and Dow learned the cause and did not tell the public.
Vietnam and Agent Orange
In 1961 the president of South Vietnam was at war with the newly formed Viet Cong, a guerrilla force fighting to unite Vietnam under a communist regime. The Viet Cong were masters of the jungle, laying traps and ambushing from underground tunnels. Losing, the president faced a choice: accept defeat in the jungle or destroy the jungle. He asked his American allies for help, and they arrived flying in thousands of barrels of herbicide. This was Operation Ranch Hand.
The herbicide of choice was Agent Orange, a 50/50 blend of 2,4-D and 2,4,5-T supplied by America's biggest chemical manufacturers, the largest by volume being Monsanto. Agent Orange ravaged South Vietnam, destroying 20% of its jungles, and civilians and soldiers on both sides were sprayed too, mostly by accident. The government assured everyone it was not toxic to humans, animals, or drinking water. Monsanto and Dow knew otherwise. During Ranch Hand they secretly traded information on their herbicides, and in one letter Dow acknowledged dioxin was the most toxic compound it had ever experienced, with even trace amounts causing incapacitating acne. By 1965 both companies plainly understood the threat, yet there are no records that either warned the US government, and Dow's vice president reportedly said that if the government learned about this, the whole industry would suffer.
So the US sprayed South Vietnam with 72 million liters of Agent Orange, containing just 80 liters of dioxin. That small amount did irreparable damage. Civilians and soldiers on both sides developed skin diseases and cancer, children were born with physical and mental disabilities, and by some estimates as many as three million people suffered from the effects. The public was outraged. In 1967, 5,000 scientists signed a petition condemning the president's use of the herbicides, and regulators began catching on to the dioxin in 2,4,5-T. The herbicide was about to be phased out, threatening Monsanto's bottom line. The company needed a miracle, fast.
Roundup: the discovery of glyphosate
Monsanto's plan was to replace 2,4,5-T with a safer herbicide, but after nine years its scientists were getting nowhere. The whole effort was known internally as a dead area. One of the last researchers on it was John E. Franz, and by early 1970 he was about to quit too. Before giving up he ran one final set of experiments, dreaming up 19 candidate compounds. The first did nothing. The second was 10 times more powerful than any herbicide the team had ever seen, and allegedly made the plants, in the host's words, super nasty. This miracle compound was glyphosate, a phosphonic acid group on one end and a carboxyl group on the other, with an amino group in between. When a colleague flew over the outdoor test fields and saw the results, all he could write across the performance report was "Eureka." It was the best herbicide they had ever seen.
Why was it so good at killing plants? To survive, plants run a chemical pathway to build three essential amino acids, without which they die. This is the shikimate pathway, named after shikimic acid and the Japanese shikimi flower. At one step, two acids called S3P and PEP must combine into a third compound, but only with the help of an enzyme called EPSPS. Glyphosate has a geometry very similar to PEP, so it mimics PEP and binds to EPSPS first, blocking the enzyme from catalyzing the reaction. The acids cannot transform, the pathway collapses, the amino acids are never built, and the plant dies. Crucially, the shikimate pathway exists only in plants, bacteria, and fungi. Humans and animals do not have it; we get those amino acids from food. For Monsanto this was the marketing dream: glyphosate targets an enzyme found in plants but not in humans or pets. Research also showed soil microorganisms broke glyphosate down into safe byproducts, meaning it was biodegradable. After decades of toxic products, Monsanto finally had one it was sure was safe.
Figure 3. The mechanism that made glyphosate a miracle. Normally EPSPS joins S3P and PEP to keep the shikimate pathway running and build the amino acids a plant needs. Glyphosate is shaped enough like PEP to bind EPSPS first and jam it, so the plant starves of amino acids and dies. Because only plants, bacteria, and fungi run this pathway, Monsanto could honestly claim the target enzyme is absent in people and pets.
In 1974 Monsanto launched its new hit herbicide, Roundup. Farmers loved it because, unlike 2,4-D, glyphosate killed every weed, grassy ones too, not just broad leaved ones. That enabled no till farming. Normally you plow up an entire field to clear weeds before planting, which hurts the soil and is hard work. With Roundup you spray the whole field, everything dies, and you plant directly into the residue: easier, faster, cheaper. Monsanto marketed it as safer than table salt and basically safe enough to drink, fit for use where kids and pets play, breaking down into natural materials. By the late 1980s the company was selling seven million pounds of Roundup and making a billion dollars a year, and it was not going to share a penny of it.
Here the patent strategy gets clever. With most herbicides, like the moderately popular alachlor, you can tweak the molecule slightly and still get a potent weed killer, so a patent on one specific molecule leaves competitors free to use hundreds of close relatives. Glyphosate was different: modify it in any way and its herbicidal properties vanish entirely. So Monsanto could rest easy knowing that until its patent expired in the year 2000, it alone could sell it.
How Monsanto controls seeds: the gene gun and Roundup Ready
Glyphosate had one problem. Because Roundup kills everything green, farmers could only really spray it twice, right before planting or right after harvest, otherwise it would kill the crop along with the weeds. Monsanto saw an opportunity. If it could make crops like soybean or corn resistant to Roundup, farmers could spray all season long, killing weeds but not the crop, and Monsanto would sell both the herbicide and the resistant seed, a complete monopoly over both ends.
The first idea was straightforward: glyphosate blocks EPSPS, so edit the plant's DNA to make more EPSPS. With enough enzyme, glyphosate cannot block it all and the plant survives. They tried it on petunias. It half worked; the flowers survived a tiny dose of Roundup but a normal dose still killed them. Monsanto was stumped, and out of time, because while glyphosate and Roundup were patented, a Roundup resistant seed was not, and competitors knew it. In 1985 a company called Calgene published a paper in Nature showing tobacco made slightly resistant to glyphosate. The clock was running, and Monsanto's researchers called the race their Manhattan Project.
Then an engineer had a genius idea. Monsanto ran factories converting phosphate into glyphosate, with sludge leaching out of them. Anything alive in that sludge might already be resistant to glyphosate. The researchers scooped out the sludge and found a strain of salmonella thriving in it, surprising because salmonella normally relies on the shikimate pathway. They isolated its genetic sequence and found it had evolved a mutated EPSPS enzyme whose shape glyphosate could not bind. They took that salmonella DNA and loaded it onto a gene gun, placing thousands of DNA strips onto microscopic gold particles and firing them into plant tissue at 1,400 kilometers per hour. Some gold particles reached the cell nucleus, the DNA detached and integrated into the plant's chromosomes, and from then on every cell division copied the new EPSPS gene. They planted seeds carrying the gene, sprayed Roundup, and nothing happened. The soybean was resistant. Monsanto soon found even more potent bacteria, made other crops immune, and by 1998 held patents for glyphosate resistant canola, corn, and cotton. It called the lineup Roundup Ready.
Figure 4. How Monsanto patented a living plant. A salmonella strain surviving in glyphosate sludge carried a mutated EPSPS gene that glyphosate could not bind. Monsanto coated that DNA onto gold particles, fired them into plant cells at 1,400 kilometers per hour, and the gene integrated into the chromosomes so every future cell carried it. The crop became Roundup Ready, and Monsanto now owned both the seed and the herbicide it was sold with.
Roundup Ready seeds took over the market instantly. By 2001 more than 70% of all soybeans grown in the US were Monsanto's, with Roundup making more than $2.5 billion a year, the best selling agricultural product ever. Every farmer could join the revolution by signing Monsanto's Technology Use Agreement. The host reads from a 2011 copy. The grower agrees not to save or clean any crop produced from the seed for planting, meaning you cannot keep this year's seed to plant next year. The grower also agrees not to supply seed produced from the seed to anyone else, meaning you cannot share or sell your seed. The grower further agrees to give Monsanto and its representatives access to the farmed land to examine and sample the crops, residue, or seeds. And the final term: the grower accepts these notice requirements by signing the agreement, or by opening a bag of seeds. You agree just by opening the bag.
Practice
Saved or open pollinated seed
Patented Roundup Ready seed
Replant next year's crop
Allowed, the oldest practice in farming
Forbidden by contract; sued as patent infringement
Share or sell seed to a neighbor
Allowed
Forbidden
Clean and store the harvest as seed
Allowed
Forbidden
Inspection of your land
None
Monsanto may enter, examine, and sample crops and residue
How you agree to the terms
No terms
By signing, or simply by opening a bag of seeds
Spraying window for Roundup
Limited, kills the crop
All season; the crop is engineered to survive it
Figure 5. What the Technology Use Agreement changed. For ten thousand years farmers saved seed from one harvest to plant the next. The patented seed contract converts that ordinary act into a breach and an act of patent infringement, while handing Monsanto inspection rights over a grower's own land, agreed to merely by opening a bag.
The host pauses to put the contract in perspective: as strange as it reads, the terms and conditions people sign online today are arguably worse, social media policies that collect biometric identifiers, infer your age and gender, scan your face, and sell or use the data to train AI models. That is the lead in to the video's sponsor, Incogni, a service that contacts data brokers to delete your personal data. The host says he started using it in June, that it had already reached 46 brokers with 42 deletions completed, and points viewers to incogni.com/veritasium with the code Veritasium for 60% off, then returns to the farmers.
Could farmers simply refuse Monsanto's seeds? Not really, because of drift. If your neighbor planted Roundup Ready and sprayed Roundup, the herbicide drifting onto your non resistant field would kill your plants. Worried about losing their crops, neighbors adopted Roundup Ready too, and Monsanto soon controlled the whole market. One Ohio seed grower recalled Monsanto salesmen telling people to sign on or be out of business within two years. Hundreds of thousands of farmers signed, and it was not a good deal.
The crop mafia: private detectives and 1-800-ROUNDUP
One evening in late July 2004, an Indiana farmer named Dave Runyon was relaxing at home when two men knocked. They claimed to be doing a magazine survey, asking what crops he planted, what herbicides he used, what seed he bought. Runyon was not interested and went to shut the door, when he heard one of them say, "I think he's guilty." Months later he got a letter from Monsanto giving him seven days to turn over all his business records. He was stunned, because he was one of the few farmers who had never signed a Monsanto contract, yet they were threatening to sue him for patent infringement after someone tipped them off that he had replanted their seeds. Farmers across the country were getting the same letters.
It is hard to overstate how much Monsanto tried to control farmers. It sent private detectives and former police officers to inspect farms across the US, waving contract terms in farmers' faces to gain access to their property. It hired plane and helicopter pilots to survey farmland from above for signs of infringement. And it ran a company hotline, 1-800-ROUNDUP, that farmers could call to report on their neighbors. The host actually dials it on camera and reaches the prompt: if you have information about the misuse of seed or a compliance issue, press three. As Runyon put it, there was much mistrust in the countryside; you never knew who might report you, and someone could willfully plant unauthorized seed on your land to destroy you.
In 2010 Monsanto responded to the outcry with a commitment statement pledging transparency and ethical behavior, promising to introduce its investigators with proper identification and not to exercise its patent rights when only trace amounts of its seed appeared in a field. It let Runyon go, but by 2013 it had sued more than 400 farmers, raking in over $20 million. Many went bankrupt, and countless others settled out of court even when innocent, unable to risk the legal fees. The investigative journalist in the film recalls Monsanto influencing radio stations that would publicly name people accused of saving Roundup seeds on air. Locals started calling the company Mon-satan.
This culture of fear turned neighbors against each other, especially where some farmers did not want Monsanto's system. One of them was Mike Wallace, the Arkansas farmer from the opening. Wallace grew soybean that was not resistant to Monsanto's herbicide, while his neighbor used Monsanto's system. The herbicide in question here was not glyphosate but Monsanto's other product, dicamba, still sold inside the Roundup and Roundup Ready framework. Wallace noticed his soybean dying and suspected dicamba was drifting from the neighboring farm, evidence being that the weeds under the neighbor's soybean were dying too. He believed it cost him around $100,000 in damages, but the neighbor denied fault. Tensions rose, Wallace arranged to meet one of the farm's workers on a country road to talk it out, and it went sour fast. Allegedly Wallace grabbed the worker's arm, the worker pulled back, drew his gun, and shot Wallace until the gun was empty. Similar tragedies were unfolding worldwide as Monsanto pushed into farming communities in India, Argentina, Canada, Brazil, and Vietnam. By the 2010s it was an almost untouchable monopoly.
The Monsanto Papers: capturing the science
Then, out of the blue, on March 20, 2015, an independent science panel called the International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC), part of the World Health Organization, published a finding that glyphosate is probably carcinogenic to humans. It shocked everyone, especially Monsanto, because other big health bodies, including the EPA and the WHO itself, IARC's own parent, had said glyphosate posed no carcinogenic risk. The classification stunned the public precisely because Monsanto had spent more than 40 years convincing the world the stuff was safer than table salt. The company was furious. On the same day it sent a scathing letter to the WHO demanding the classification be rectified immediately, claiming IARC had ignored dozens of studies and that conclusions must be non biased, thorough, and based on quality science. Soon five review papers appeared bashing the IARC decision.
Why would IARC disagree with everyone else and ignore so many studies? That was exactly the question California lawyer Brent Wisner set out to answer. Wisner had been looking into Monsanto over claims that Roundup was decimating bee populations, but then a colleague told him about her cousin in law, a farmer who had used Roundup as long as anyone could remember and who, along with his dog, developed non-Hodgkin's lymphoma (NHL), a cancer of the lymphatic system, and died in late 2015. The IARC paper had specifically noted the strongest evidence was for NHL, and reports of Roundup users diagnosed with it were multiplying. It looked like more than coincidence. Wisner could not take Monsanto alone, so he teamed with other lawyers and an investigative journalist who had reported on the company for decades and concluded it really did not care about its customers.
The group sued and forced Monsanto to hand over its internal emails, memos, and safety studies. What surfaced was a pattern of saying one thing publicly and the opposite internally. In 1983 Monsanto submitted a glyphosate toxicology study to the EPA to get it classified as safe, but the data showed mice on higher doses developing rare kidney tumors. The EPA wanted to classify glyphosate as a possible human carcinogen and asked for more studies. Monsanto fought back, insisting the agency was reading the data wrong, and pushed until 1989, when the EPA suddenly reversed, saying a repeat of the mouse oncogenicity study would not be required at this time. In 1991 the EPA instead classified glyphosate as having evidence of non carcinogenicity for humans. The cancer concern in mice was never made public.
Worse was the landmark safety paper. In 2000 a study formally titled the Safety Evaluation and Risk Assessment of the Herbicide Roundup and Its Active Ingredient Glyphosate for Humans, commonly called Williams, Kroes, and Munro after its authors, concluded Roundup posed no health risk to humans. It was cited over 1,200 times and treated by regulators as the foundational independent paper proving glyphosate safe. Except it was not independent. Monsanto's director of toxicology, William Heydens, was listed on it as providing scientific support. In a 2017 deposition Heydens called his contributions merely editorial, just to make it easier to read. Internally he had written that he sprouted several new gray hairs writing the thing, that he would strangle Kroes or Williams if they asked for rewrites, and that the plan was for Monsanto to keep costs down by doing the writing while the named authors would just edit and sign their names, recalling exactly how Williams, Kroes, and Munro had been handled. They celebrated when it was done, calling it their defense of glyphosate around the world.
The pattern was everywhere. Monsanto tried to change glyphosate cancer classifications at different agencies, seemingly colluded with corrupt EPA officials to kill opposing research, and ghostwrote safety studies. By mid 2017 Wisner released all of it publicly as the Monsanto Papers. People were furious. Newly released documents showed executives colluding with corrupted EPA officials and trying to influence media and science reports; the company appeared to have been caught red handed, with a paper trail back to the 1980s. Lawyers were overwhelmed by calls from cancer patients who had used Roundup and developed NHL, and by year's end more than 3,000 victims had signed onto the case.
Monsanto fought every claim. Remember the five papers bashing the IARC decision? The main review article among them was ghostwritten by Monsanto, edited and changed by people who worked for the company, and journals declined to retract it; it is still online today. The company also ran what it called its Let Nothing Go strategy: if someone tweeted that Roundup causes cancer, an onslaught of responders would descend. Monsanto ran training operations bringing in nutritionists and academics, coaching them on what to say and how. The film shows a contributor in Argentina insisting glyphosate is not causing cancer there and that you could drink a whole quart without harm, then declining to actually drink the glyphosate offered to him, because he is not stupid. These responders became an army Monsanto could deploy whenever a news article appeared. Asked whether some comments under his own video might be written by Monsanto, the journalist says he would not be surprised. But all the manufactured confusion was not enough. By the summer of 2018 the truth was out and over 11,000 plaintiffs had filed suit. This was going to destroy Monsanto.
The escape, the verdicts, and how dangerous Roundup really is
Monsanto had an escape plan. Just as the first lawsuit began, it signed an acquisition deal with the German chemical giant Bayer. Monsanto cashed in, its executives rode off into the sunset, and Bayer was left holding the bag. Why would Bayer buy a company with hundreds of thousands of plaintiffs waiting on a verdict? The journalist says that is the question investors keep asking, and notes a Wall Street Journal headline along the lines of "worst acquisition in history." Bayer's stock tanked immediately and only got worse. A few months later the first case went to trial, brought by Dewayne Lee Johnson, a groundskeeper who developed NHL after being doused with Roundup at work. Faced with evidence from the Monsanto Papers, the jury sided with Johnson and awarded him $289 million in damages, and Bayer had to pay. By 2025 Bayer had settled more than a hundred thousand cancer lawsuits over Roundup, amounting to over $10 billion in settlements. Bayer, which now owns Monsanto, denies any wrongdoing and rejects that Roundup caused the plaintiffs' cancer.
So after all the scandal, how dangerous is Roundup really? The journalist's framing is pointed: if it truly causes no cancer and poses no real risk, why would Monsanto spend millions on ghostwritten studies and PR firms and engage in so much deception? According to IARC, a major concern is genotoxicity. Studies suggest that heavy overexposure, of the kind many farmers experience, may substantially damage DNA in cells, a common mechanism for carcinogens. Other studies point back to the shikimate pathway. We do not use it, but the bacteria in our gut do, so ingesting trace glyphosate through food could disrupt the gut microbiome by hitting the EPSP synthase in our microflora, with all sorts of possible effects. IARC never specified the dose at which glyphosate becomes dangerous, only that overall it is a probable carcinogen.
For context, IARC's same "probable carcinogen" category includes eating red meat, high temperature frying, and working night shifts. The category above it, certain carcinogens, holds alcohol, tobacco, and sunlight. From Veritasium's earlier episode on forever chemicals, PFOA is a category one certain carcinogen, while PFOS sits at 2B, only a possible carcinogen, below glyphosate. From the data, glyphosate does not look like a particularly potent carcinogen, but high exposure is clearly associated with a modest increase in the risk of certain cancers, and people with higher exposures are clearly at higher risk. The EPA and the European Food Safety Authority still disagree with IARC and call glyphosate an unlikely carcinogen, but US courts have repeatedly told the EPA it is not doing a proper assessment and not following its own rules. The journalist estimates that more than 50%, possibly far more, of the papers on glyphosate safety were industry funded, reflecting a constant desire by these companies to control the science.
Today Bayer still denies glyphosate is a carcinogen. Yet Bayer removed glyphosate from its consumer products, so a current bottle of Roundup does not even contain it anymore. Part of that is the backlash and lawsuits, but part is that glyphosate does not work as well as it used to. We overused it: since the 1970s more than 60 species of weed have evolved resistance, exactly like that first salmonella sample near the factory. What replaced glyphosate in those Roundup sprays? Mostly 2,4-D, the very first selective herbicide from 1942, bringing the story full circle.
Figure 6. Where glyphosate sits. IARC places glyphosate in Group 2A, probable carcinogen, alongside red meat, night shift work, and high temperature frying. The stronger Group 1 holds tobacco, alcohol, sunlight, and PFOA, while PFOS rests one rung below glyphosate at Group 2B. The classification reflects strength of evidence that something can cause cancer, not how potent it is at a given dose.
Where it stands: an honest footnote
The video closes on the bigger lesson rather than a verdict on any single molecule. Many people will go through life unaffected by glyphosate, while others may develop cancer or other disease, which is exactly why the film argues the most sensitive individuals deserve protection. The deeper problem is structural: a company as large as Monsanto can infiltrate academia, push around scientists, manipulate results, manufacture confusion, and avoid punishment. When you do not build firewalls between the regulated and the regulators, you create distrust in science itself. The film's contributors are candid that science is never fully disconnected from the realities of the world and is in that sense socially constructed, but insist that is an argument for stronger rules and clearer independence, not weaker ones. The disagreement between IARC on one side and the EPA and EFSA on the other is real and unresolved; what the film documents beyond dispute is the concealment, the ghostwriting, and the regulatory capture, which it treats as the scandal regardless of glyphosate's exact toxicity.
Key takeaways
Modern selective herbicides began in 1942 when Franklin D. Jones found that 2,4-D, and then 2,4,5-T, killed broad leaved weeds while sparing grasses like wheat, corn, and barley.
The herbicide 2,4,5-T was contaminated with dioxin, which forms when the synthesis runs a few degrees above 170 degrees Celsius. Monsanto and Dow learned this caused their workers' disfiguring acne and stayed silent.
Agent Orange was a 50/50 blend of 2,4-D and 2,4,5-T, supplied mostly by Monsanto. 72 million liters sprayed on Vietnam carried 80 liters of dioxin, and by some estimates harmed three million people.
Glyphosate, discovered by John Franz in 1970, blocks the EPSPS enzyme in the shikimate pathway, a pathway humans lack. Monsanto sold it as Roundup from 1974 as safer than table salt.
Because any modification destroys glyphosate's activity, Monsanto's single patent gave it a true monopoly until 2000, unlike herbicides with usable molecular relatives.
Roundup Ready crops were engineered by firing a glyphosate resistant EPSPS gene, taken from factory sludge salmonella, into plants with a gene gun. Monsanto then owned both the seed and the herbicide.
The Technology Use Agreement forbade saving, cleaning, or sharing seed and granted Monsanto inspection rights, agreed to by opening a bag. Monsanto used detectives, aircraft, a 1-800-ROUNDUP hotline, and over 400 lawsuits to enforce it.
The 2015 IARC ruling that glyphosate is a probable carcinogen triggered Brent Wisner's lawsuits, which forced out the Monsanto Papers: buried mouse tumor data, the ghostwritten Williams, Kroes, and Munro paper, and the Let Nothing Go campaign.
Monsanto sold to Bayer in 2018 just as the lawsuits began. Dewayne Lee Johnson won $289 million in the first trial, and by 2025 Bayer had settled over 100,000 cases for more than $10 billion.
Over 60 weed species are now glyphosate resistant, so Roundup today often contains 2,4-D instead, and Bayer removed glyphosate from consumer products. The real lesson is the danger of letting industry capture the science meant to regulate it.
Chapters
Timestamps are clickable. Click one and the player jumps there and keeps playing while you read.
0:00 An Unusual Enemy
5:18 Monsanto's Secret Poison Problem
11:17 Vietnam and Agent Orange
14:08 Roundup
19:31 How Monsanto Controls Seeds
26:06 The Crop Mafia
31:10 The Monsanto Papers
41:18 How dangerous is Roundup really?
Notable quotes
He wasn't killed over money or land. He was killed over a herbicide, a chemical designed to destroy weeds.
Derek Muller, 0:23
So effectively, he had plant cancer in a bottle. I was just going to say plant cancer.
Veritasium, 1:38
We believe these men are excreting a foreign chemical through their skins.
Monsanto plant doctors, quoted at 2:59
If the government learns about this, the whole industry will suffer.
Dow vice president, quoted at 5:54
So you're agreeing to these terms even just by opening a bag of seeds.
Derek Muller, 10:34
You could actually willfully plant unauthorized seed in somebody's land if you want to destroy them.
Dave Runyon, quoted at 12:42
Saying one thing publicly and saying something completely different internally. The duplicity, the deception, is just jaw dropping, really.
Investigative journalist, 15:23
I'll strangle Kroes or Williams if they ask for any rewrites.
William Heydens, internal email, quoted at 16:24
Why in God's name would Monsanto have to spend millions and millions of dollars to create ghostwritten studies and hire PR companies to ghostwrite articles online?
Investigative journalist, 18:30
When you don't create firewalls between the regulated and the regulators, you have created distrust in science.
Derek Muller, 20:24
Resources mentioned
Veritasium, Derek Muller's science channel that produced this investigation.
Monsanto, the agricultural and chemical company at the center of the story, now owned by Bayer.
Bayer, the German chemical giant that acquired Monsanto in 2018 and inherited the lawsuits.
Dow Chemical, the other major US producer of 2,4,5-T and Agent Orange.
2,4-D and 2,4,5-T, the first selective herbicides, discovered around 1942.
Dioxin (TCDD), the contaminant in 2,4,5-T that poisoned factory workers.
Incogni, the video's sponsor, a personal data removal service.
Full transcript
One October evening in 2016,
an Arkansas farmer was sitting in his
pickup truck just outside his field,
and he was growing impatient.
Suddenly, another car pulled up
beside him, so the farmer got out.
Seconds later,
he was murdered.
The farmer's name was Mike Wallace.
He wasn't killed over money or land.
He was killed over a herbicide, a
chemical designed to destroy weeds.
This herbicide spread fear through rural
America, turning farmers against each other,
all because it belonged to a certain company.
This company's policies,
they pitted farmer against farmer,
and they could just send henchman to your door.
Even if you just had the
wrong seeds in your field,
they could send you to court and bankrupt you.
In effect, they had a farmland monopoly.
They owned more than 80% of the
seeds planted in the United States.
And to get this monopoly,
they played the legal system-
Colluding with corrupted EPA officials.
twisted scientific evidence.
Now appears to have been caught red-handed.
But the chemicals they were making
destroyed the health of
communities all over the world.
This is a video about Monsanto,
one of the biggest agricultural
companies in the world.
Our investigation is based on
publicly available documents,
recordings and third-party opinions.
All sources are linked in the description.
In 1942, a chemist named Franklin D. Jones
made an unusual enemy:
poison ivy.
See, his children had a very
violent reaction to the plant.
They would get intense rashes and swelling
when they brushed up against the ivy,
so Jones wanted a way to kill it.
He experimented by spraying the ivy with hormones,
chemicals that could regulate the plant's
functions the same way they
do in humans and animals.
His hope was that one of these
hormones would cause it to die.
Unfortunately, many had no effect and
others only made the ivy grow better.
But then, one day, Jones noticed
that certain samples began to show
autumn colors, much sooner than they should have.
He watched as the vibrant
hues turned to twisted shapes,
and then within days, these
plants shriveled up and died.
Jones checked the chemical he
sprayed them with, and surprisingly,
it was a growth hormone called 2,4-D.
It's an acid made up of a ring of six carbons and
hydrogens called a benzene
ring, with an acid tail.
There are also two chlorine atoms in
the two and four positions of the ring,
which is why it's called 2,4-D.
To keep things tidy, we don't have to
draw all these carbons and hydrogens,
but keep in mind they're still there.
Jones realized this synthetic
hormone was incredibly potent.
Tiny amounts of it would still
encourage the ivy to grow,
but if he sprayed on a lot
of it, 2,4-D would trigger
such uncontrollable and unsustainable growth
that the poison ivy would die in the process.
So effectively, he had plant cancer in a bottle.
I was just going to say plant cancer.
Right?
That's immediately where my brain went.
What was even more remarkable was
that it only targeted the ivy.
The grass around it was barely affected,
like it was resistant to 2,4-D.
So over the next two years, Jones performed
over a hundred different experiments
by pouring the herbicide onto
many different plant species.
And what he figured out was
that 2,4-D was really picky.
It killed broad-leaved weeds like
dandelions, chickweed, and poison ivy,
but it virtually ignored crops.
Wheat, corn, and barley were all mostly
unaffected by 2,4-D because all
of these are species of grass.
To improve this pickiness further, Jones
also tested chemicals similar to 2,4-D.
He found that adding another
chlorine to the benzene ring,
transforming it to 2,4,5-T, left
grasses even more unscathed.
He was onto something huge.
Because up until then, farmers could
get rid of weeds one of two ways.
Either you spray them with
dangerous chemicals like arsenic
or you have to pull the weeds out manually.
Either way, you're at a loss.
But with 2,4-D and 2,4,5-T, you could spray your
entire crop field, and only the weeds would die.
Jones had stumbled upon the first
practically viable selective herbicides,
so he was quick to patent them in
1945, just as the war was ending.
After the Allies victory, the patent secrecy
restrictions in most countries were lifted,
and it turned out that there were other
scientists, both in the US but also in the UK,
who discovered these herbicides independently.
Soon, the world was blessed with
modern miracle weed killers,
like Weedone and Weed-A-Bomb and Endo-Weed,
all formulations of 2,4-D and 2,4,5-T herbicides.
This man is ready to kill weeds, because
he's going to do it the easy way.
These chemicals literally replaced the hoe,
and everything from farm fields
to railroad tracks and sidewalks.
They're essentially what gave us that beautiful
green American lawn, just grass and nothing else.
Because with these herbicides, dad knew there
was no longer any excuse for a weedy lawn.
By the late 1940s, their herbicide business
had turned into a roughly $10 million industry,
and everyone wanted in, including one of
the biggest chemical companies at the time:
Monsanto.
One of Monsanto's main herbicide
factories was in Nitro, West Virginia,
where they pumped out almost
a ton of 2,4,5-T a day.
By 1949, Monsanto's business was
booming, when all of a sudden...
the plant exploded.
Over a hundred workers rushed out to see a
dark cloud rising 40 meters above the factory.
They watched as a black stinking powder
started raining down on their faces.
Within hours, many of these men fell ill.
First, they got headaches and nausea,
but then their skin began to erupt
with bumps, pustules, and acne.
The lesions on some of the workers'
faces got so bad that Monsanto's
on-site doctors had to peel off layers of
their skin in an attempt to remove them.
The doctors later noted that when these men are
in a closed room together, there is a strong odor.
They wrote, "We believe these men are excreting
a foreign chemical through their skins."
But neither the doctors nor anyone else
at Monsanto knew what the chemical was
because both 2,4,5-T and 2,4-D
were marketed as very safe.
See, when the herbicides were first getting
introduced, Jones, the original inventor,
even remarked that he knew people
who would accidentally drink or
spray the herbicides onto themselves,
and they suffered no ill health effects.
They were fine.
And one of the doctors after him remarked that:
"I've personally taken one half a gram
of pure 2,4-D a day for three weeks.
You judge the results."
It was the '40s, so people were a bit crazy.
But yeah, it seemed pretty safe.
Back at Nitro, Monsanto analyzed all the other
ingredients they were using to make 2,4,5-T,
but they still couldn't find what was causing
their workers' skin to erupt in this way.
This is where their search seemingly stopped.
With no culprit, the conditions at
the plant stayed mostly the same,
and Monsanto just offered their workers a choice:
either you'll keep on working with 2,4,5-T
or you can take the gate.
For many, this was no choice at all since
there were hardly any other jobs in town.
So, most of the workers stayed
with something inside the factory,
poisoning them for years to come.
It wasn't until 1957, 8 years after the explosion,
that a German dermatologist, Karl Schulz,
found himself treating patients with
similar-looking lesions and acne.
He wasn't surprised by the symptoms because
many of these patients worked in
2,4,5-T factories around Hamburg.
But when Schulz would test these
ingredients from the instruction
list on rabbit ears he had at the
lab, he would get no reactions.
And this puzzled him.
How do these ingredients do
nothing in his own tests,
but at the same time cause these painful
skin disorders inside 2,4,5-T factories?
Well, to make 2,4,5-T, you
start with tetrachlorobenzene,
a benzene ring with four
chlorine atoms attached to it.
These chlorine atoms are very electronegative, so
they want to steal electrons from nearby atoms.
Luckily for them, the six
carbons in the benzene ring
are all sharing their electrons in these
fuzzy donut-shaped clouds around the ring.
That's what this circle in the
diagram is meant to represent.
The chlorine atoms pull on this electron cloud,
bringing it closer to themselves, and as a result,
the carbons in the benzene ring
become slightly positively charged
and the chlorine's slightly negatively charged.
Now, if you heat up tetrachlorobenzene
with sodium hydroxide,
one of the negative hydroxide ions will want to
bind to one of the slightly positively
charged carbons in the benzene ring.
And to do that, it forces out the
chlorine atom, taking its place.
This creates trichlorophenol, or TCP, a
key ingredient in making the herbicide.
From here, if you keep the
reaction at 170 degrees Celsius,
you can add a series of chemicals to grow out
this oxygen tail into an acid, giving you 2,4,5-T.
On paper, this is all there is.
If you follow the exact steps here and control
the conditions, then none of these ingredients
will explain the horrible face eruptions
that the Nitro workers were experiencing.
But Schulz wasn't satisfied with this.
Maybe the conditions aren't perfect.
Maybe there is something in this
process, some secret reaction
that is contaminating the whole chemical supply.
Ideally, the industrial process
of transforming tetrachlorobenzene
into 2,4,5-T should happen at 170 degrees Celsius.
But if the temperature gets any
higher, even just a few degrees higher,
there is suddenly enough energy in the system
for two molecules of TCP to fuse together.
This creates a molecule commonly known as dioxin.
It forms only in trace amounts, so you
might expect to end up with roughly one
or two molecules of dioxin for every
hundred thousand molecules of 2,4,5-T.
It seemed too small to be a problem.
Nevertheless, Schulz decided to test it.
He took some TCP, this time contaminated with
trace amounts of dioxin, and
rubbed it into his own skin,
and he got the same acne as
the workers at the Nitro plant.
Once Schulz realized the threat here,
he immediately contacted all the
big chemical producers in Germany,
and one of these German companies even
sent letters to both Monsanto and Dow,
the other big herbicide producer in the US,
and they warned them that the acne-causing effects
are stemming from pollution through
byproducts, referring to dioxin.
They even listed when exactly during the process
the contamination was happening
and what to do to prevent it.
Yet, Monsanto denied ever getting these letters,
and Dow said they somehow misfiled them.
Regardless, it was obvious to
both companies that something
in the production of 2,4,5-T
was poisoning their workers.
But Monsanto didn't warn
the public about the danger,
perhaps because the herbicides were
about to make them a whole lot of money.
In 1961, the president of South Vietnam was
at war with the newly founded Viet Cong.
This guerrilla force was set on overthrowing his
rule and uniting Vietnam under a communist regime.
The Viet Cong were masters of the jungle.
They laid deadly traps for their enemies
and ambushed them using underground tunnels.
South Vietnam was losing the war,
so the president faced a choice:
either accept defeat in the jungle or destroy it.
He reached out to his allies,
the US, and asked them for help.
Soon, they came in flying with
thousands of barrels of herbicide.
This was the start of Operation Ranch Hand.
The US's herbicide of choice was Agent Orange,
a 50/50 split of 2,4-D and 2,4,5-T supplied
by the US's biggest chemical manufacturers.
The largest supplier by volume was Monsanto.
Agent Orange ravaged through South
Vietnam destroying 20% of the jungles.
And civilians and soldiers on both sides
got sprayed with it too, mostly by accident.
The government assured them
that it is not toxic to humans,
animals, or drinking water, but
Monsanto and Dow knew otherwise.
See during Ranch Hand, they secretly
exchanged information on their herbicides.
And in one of the letters,
Dow acknowledged that dioxin,
which had been contaminating 2,4,5-T for years
was "the most toxic compound
they have ever experienced",
and that even trace amounts of
it caused incapacitating acne.
By 1965, it was obvious that both companies
understood what sort of threat dioxin was,
and yet there are no records
that Monsanto or Dow ever sent
communication to the US government
warning them about the threat.
In fact, Dow's vice president reportedly said,
"If the government learns about this,
the whole industry will suffer."
As a result, the US sprayed South Vietnam
with 72 million liters of Agent Orange,
within which was just 80 liters of dioxin.
And even though that doesn't seem
like much, the damage was irreparable.
Civilians and soldiers on both sides
suffered from skin diseases and cancer.
Children were born with physical
and mental disabilities.
By some estimates, as many as three million
people suffered from the effects of Agent Orange.
This outraged the public.
In 1967, 5,000 scientists signed a petition to the
president condemning his use of the herbicides.
And Monsanto was under scrutiny too,
because regulators were catching on
to the dioxin contained in 2,4,5-T.
The herbicide was about to be phased
out, compromising their bottom line.
Monsanto needed a miracle,
and they needed it fast.
Their idea was to replace
2,4,5-T with a safer herbicide.
But after nine years of research,
they weren't getting anywhere.
All of the scientists in
the Agricultural department
referred to this new initiative as a dead area.
One of the last remaining scientists
on the project was John E. Franz,
and by early 1970, he was about to give it up too.
But before abandoning the project, Franz
decided to do one final set of experiments,
so he thought up 19 possible
assets that could maybe work
as herbicides and decided to test them out.
He prepped the first herbicide,
but nothing happened.
The plant was completely fine,
and the herbicide had no activity.
Then he decided to test the second
herbicide, and he applied it to a plant.
It was 10 times more powerful than
any herbicide the team had ever seen.
And allegedly, it made the plants super...
It made the plants super nasty.
That was disgusting.
This miracle compound was glyphosate,
a phosphonic acid group on one end and a
carboxyl group on the other with a nitrogen,
hydrogen, or amino group in between.
To make sure it was commercially feasible,
Franz and his colleague set up
tests in these outdoor fields.
And as one of the scientists was
getting back to these test sites,
he saw the results from the plane.
It was clear as day.
All he could do is write Eureka
across the performance report.
It was the best herbicide they'd ever seen.
What made it so great at killing plants?
Well, for plants to survive,
they use a chemical pathway,
a series of reactions to create three important
amino acids, acids without which they die.
This process is known as the
Shikimate pathway because it
starts with shikimic acid named
after the Japanese Shikimi flower.
During one of the steps, two acids, S3P and
PEP need to transform into a third compound,
but they can only do that with the
help of an enzyme called EPSPS,
which catalyzes the reaction and
helps the two molecules combine.
However, if glyphosate is
present during this reaction,
it will begin to mimic PEP because
they have a very similar geometry.
And because of that, glyphosate actually binds
first to EPSPS blocking it
from acting as a catalyst.
Now, the acids can't transform and the
whole Shikimate pathway is destroyed.
Without it, there are no amino
acids and the plant dies.
Crucially, the Shikimate pathway is unique
to plants and things like bacteria and fungi.
Humans and animals don't have it.
In fact, we have to eat foods that
contain these three amino acids.
But for Monsanto, this was good
news because they could market
that glyphosate targets an enzyme found
in plants, but not in humans or pets.
After decades of toxic products, Monsanto
finally had one which they were sure was safe.
And research was also showing
that after you spray glyphosate,
the microorganisms in the soil
break it down into safe byproducts.
It was biodegradable.
Glyphosate was perfect, so they wasted
no time in getting it on the market.
In 1974, Monsanto had a new hit herbicide...
Roundup.
Roundup is better.
It goes through the plant to
kill it, tops and rhizomes.
My roots hurt real bad.
Hank, Hank!
Roundup. No root, no weed, no problem.
Farmers loved it because unlike
2,4-D, glyphosate killed every weed,
not just broad-leaved ones, but grassy too.
It allowed them to practice
something called no-till farming.
See, usually to get rid of weeds, you'd have to
plow up the entire field before planting anything,
and that would hurt the soil,
and it was also just a lot work.
But with Roundup, what you do is you
spray the whole field, everything dies,
and then you just plant directly into the residue.
It was easier, faster, and cheaper.
And Roundup was safe to use too.
They marketed it as safer than table
salt and safe enough to drink, basically.
Roundup can be used where kids and pets will
play and breaks down into natural materials.
By the late eighties, Monsanto
was selling seven million pounds
of Roundup and making a billion dollars each year.
And they weren't going to share a
penny of that money with anyone.
See, with other herbicides,
like for example, Alachlor,
which was moderately popular at the time,
you can tweak the molecule a bit here or there,
and you still get a very potent weed killer,
so if you patented a specific herbicide,
your competitors could still use
hundreds of its close relatives,
which would still work perfectly well
without violating your patent rights.
But glyphosate was different,
if you were to modify the molecule in any way,
its herbicidal properties were completely gone,
so Monsanto could rest easy
knowing that until the year 2000,
they would be the only ones able to sell it.
But there was a little problem with glyphosate.
See, unlike 2,4-D, which only killed
broadleaved weeds, Roundup kills everything.
I sprayed some of my own houseplants
here and well, you can see the results.
Chances are if it's green,
Roundup is going to kill it.
And this was a problem because farmers could
only really spray Roundup on their field twice,
either right before planting the
seeds or right after a harvest.
But for Monsanto, this
wasn't as much of a problem.
See, they thought if we could somehow make the
crops like soybean or corn resistant to Roundup,
well then farmers could spray it on
their field during the whole year,
and it would keep killing the weeds,
but not the Roundup resistant crops.
Crops which Monsanto could sell them.
And as a result, they would
have a complete monopoly
over both the herbicide and the seed supply.
Monsanto's idea was this,
if glyphosate blocks the EPSPS enzyme in plants
then they could edit the plant's DNA so
that the cells just create more EPSPS.
If there's enough of the enzyme then
glyphosate can't block all of it,
and so the plant can still survive.
They tried this out on
petunias, but it didn't work.
The flowers would survive a tiny amount of
Roundup, but a normal dose would still kill them.
Monsanto was kind of stumped, and
they didn't have time to rest,
because while glyphosate and Roundup were under
their patents, a Roundup resistant seed wasn't.
And their competitors knew this.
In 1985, a company called Calgene published
a paper in nature showing that they made
tobacco slightly resistant to glyphosate.
The paper showed promise, but more importantly,
it made it clear to Monsanto that
they were running out of time.
Their researchers were desperate calling
this patent race the "Manhattan Project".
And then one of the engineers had a genius idea.
Monsanto had a ton of these factories where
they were converting phosphate into glyphosate,
and they had a lot of sludge
leaching out of these factories,
so if there was anything living
around these factories in this sludge,
there was a chance it was resistant to glyphosate.
The researchers went to one of these factories,
scooped it out, and found a
strain of salmonella in there,
which was surprising to them because salmonella
usually relies on the Shikimate pathway,
but here it was thriving in glyphosate.
Monsanto's scientists isolated
the salmonella's genetic sequence,
and found that it had evolved a way to
mutate the shape of its EPSPS enzyme
so that glyphosate couldn't bind to
it and block the Shikimate pathway.
The scientists took that salmonella
DNA and loaded it onto a gene gun,
not this one here, but it's
actually surprisingly similar.
See, they placed thousands of these salmonella DNA
strips onto microscopic gold
particles in the gene gun,
which they then fired into the plant tissue
all over, at 1,400 kilometers per hour.
The gold particles would bombard the plant cells,
and some of them would make it into the nucleus.
Here, the DNA detaches from the gold, and it
integrates itself into the plant's chromosomes.
Now, every time this cell divides,
it copies over the new EPSPS gene.
Monsanto scientists planted seeds with these genes
out in the field and sprayed them with Roundup,
but nothing happened. The soybean was resistant.
Monsanto made sure to act quickly soon
after they found even more potent bacteria,
and they were able to make
other crop species immune too.
And by 1998, they had patents for glyphosate
resistant canola, corn, and cotton.
They called this lineup of
GMO seeds Roundup Ready.
These Roundup Ready seeds took
over the market in an instant.
Already by 2001, more than 70%
of all soybeans grown in the US
were Monsanto's with Roundup making
them more than $2.5 billion a year.
It was the best-selling agricultural product ever.
And every farmer could join in on this
Roundup plus Roundup Ready revolution
just by signing Monsanto's
Technology Use Agreement.
I've got one of these agreements from 2011
here, and I just wanted to read some terms.
The grower or the farmer who accepts and wants to
use these seeds agrees to not save or clean
any crop produced from the seed for planting.
And the farmer also agrees not to supply the seed
produced from the seed to anyone for planting,
meaning you cannot save the seeds you
bought last year to plant this year,
and you also cannot share or
sell your seeds to anyone else.
Here's another one, the farmer agrees
to identify and allow Monsanto and its
representatives access to the land
farmed by the grower or the farmer.
And this allows Monsanto to examine
and take samples of the crops,
crop residue or the seeds located therein.
And here's a final one, the grower
accepts the terms of the following
notice requirements by signing this agreement,
or by opening a bag of seeds.
So you're agreeing to these terms
even just by opening a bag of seeds.
If you thought that this contract was crazy,
you should see the stuff that
we sign up to today online.
I have some terms and conditions
here from a social media website.
Here's what it says.
"We may collect biometric identifiers,
and we may infer your attributes,
such as age range and gender."
So they're able to scan your face
and sell that data to advertisers.
And just in the last couple of
months, companies have been making
these aggressive pushes to their terms and
conditions to try and get more of your data,
and they can use it to train AI models
or just sell it to data brokers.
And this doesn't just mean annoying
ads and spam emails and phone calls.
Law enforcement can buy your data,
and normal people can buy it too.
Even stuff like your location history.
And all of that is perfectly legal,
but luckily you can take steps to prevent it
with the help of today's sponsor, Incogni.
See, I started using Incogni in June.
Look, you can see that they already contacted
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The new thing is that they now offer
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So if you are browsing online
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And if you want to extend that
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That's incogni.com/veritasium, or you can
also click the link in the description.
I want to thank Incogni for
sponsoring this part of the video,
and now back to farmers and the terms
and conditions they had to sign.
Well, couldn't farmers just decide not
to use Monsanto's seeds and herbicide?
The thing was, you have Roundup Ready
seeds and you spray them with Roundup,
everything's going to be fine on your end.
But your neighbor doesn't
have Roundup Ready seeds,
so if your herbicide drifts over to your
neighbor's side, it's going to kill his plants.
So neighbors were concerned thinking
their crops were going to be lost,
so they got Roundup Ready as well, and soon
enough, Monsanto controlled the whole market.
And the control didn't end there.
As one seed grower from Ohio remembers it,
Monsanto's salesman would tell
people they could either sign on,
or they'd all be out of business
within the next two years.
Monsanto was going to dominate
the entire seed industry,
and there was nothing anybody could do about it.
So hundreds of thousands of farmers
signed the deal, and it wasn't a good one.
One evening in late July of 2004,
an Indiana farmer named Dave Runyon was relaxing
at home when two men knocked on his door.
They led me to believe that they
were doing a survey for a magazine.
They wanted to know what kind of crops I planted.
They wanted to know what kind of herbicides I
used, the seed I bought and purchased and used.
Runyon wasn't interested, so
he decided to shut the door,
when he heard one of the men
say, "I think he's guilty."
Runyon didn't know what they
meant, but a few months later,
he got a letter from Monsanto saying that he had
seven days to turn over all of his
business records to the company.
He was shocked, because Runyon was one of the few
farmers that never signed
a contract with Monsanto,
and yet here they were threatening
to sue him for patent infringement.
Apparently, someone had tipped Monsanto off that
Runyon had been replanting their seeds illegally,
and farmers all across the country
were getting the same types of letters.
Honestly, it's kind of hard to overstate
how much Monsanto tried to control farmers.
They sent private detectives and ex-cops
to inspect farms all over the US,
waving their terms and conditions of the contract
into farmers' faces to let
them onto their property.
They hired plane and helicopter pilots to survey
the farmlands from above
for signs of infringement.
The lawsuits, the threats.
How could people possibly stand up to them?
And they even had a company hotline,
1-800-ROUNDUP, that farmers could
call to snitch on their neighbors.
It still exists.
1-800-ROUNDUP.
You're calling them now?
I think I got it right.
If you have information about the misuse of
seed or a compliance issue, please press three.
That phone number was in existence in the
same time that we're talking about there,
where people could rat out their neighbor.
As Runyon himself puts it, "There is
much mistrust in the countryside today.
You never know who might report on you.
You could actually willfully plant unauthorized
seed in somebody's land if
you want to destroy them."
Now, in 2010, Monsanto responded
to farmers' concerns about these
investigations and released a commitment
statement regarding their patents.
They mentioned their pledge to
transparency and ethical behavior,
properly introducing themselves
with displayed identification,
and not exercising their patent rights when only
trace amounts of their seed is
present in a farmer's field.
While Monsanto ultimately ended
up letting Runyon go, by 2013,
they sued over 400 farmers,
raking in over $20 million.
Many of these farmers went bankrupt,
and countless others settled with Monsanto
out of court even if they were innocent,
because they just couldn't risk the legal fees.
You know, they were actually
influencing radio stations at one point,
and the radio stations would
publicly say the name of the
people who were saving Roundup seeds on air.
That sounds like a supervillain plot, really.
Yeah, well people actually started
calling them Mon-satan, so...
This culture of fear and paranoia
turned neighbors against each other,
especially in communities where some farmers
didn't wish to use Monsanto's herbicide system.
One of those farmers was Mike Wallace.
See, Mike had a field of soybean here that
wasn't resistant to Monsanto's herbicide,
but his neighbor who was also growing
soybean did use Monsanto's system.
Now, to be clear, this herbicide
wasn't glyphosate itself, it was
Monsanto's other herbicide product called Dicamba,
but it was still packaged in this
Roundup and Roundup Ready system.
Now, one day Mike noticed that some of
his soybean was dying, and he suspected
it was the herbicide from the neighboring
farm drifting over, killing his soybean,
and he could tell this was the
case because the weeds underneath
the neighbor's soybean were dying,
allegedly because of the herbicide.
And he believed this caused him around
a hundred thousand dollars in damages,
but the neighbor denied that it was his fault.
Now, the tensions between the two farms grew,
so Mike wanted to chat with one of the workers
from the farm to discuss the situation.
They met on a country field road near both
farms, and what happened next isn't really clear.
Things got sour quickly.
Allegedly, Mike grabbed the worker's arm, so
the worker pulled back and pulled out his gun,
"shooting Wallace until the gun was empty".
Similar kinds of tragedies were
happening all over the world.
Monsanto infiltrated farming communities in India,
Argentina, Canada, Brazil, and even Vietnam.
By the 2010s, they were an
almost untouchable monopoly.
Then out of the blue on March 20th
2015, an independent science panel
called the International Agency
for Research on Cancer, or IARC,
came out with this,
a paper saying, "Glyphosate is
probably carcinogenic to humans."
The most popular weed killer
in the world may cause cancer.
IARC's classification of glyphosate
as a probable carcinogen.
damage to chromosomes and DNA in human cells.
This came as a shock to
everyone, especially Monsanto.
They don't know how IARC could
reach a conclusion such as this one.
See, other big health organizations, like the
US Environmental Protection Agency, the EPA,
and even the World Health Organization, which
is actually the parent organization to IARC,
both claimed that glyphosate posed no
carcinogenic risk to humans and animals.
I think the IARC designation took
the public by such huge surprise,
because Monsanto had really done
such a good job for 40-plus years
convincing the world that this
stuff was safer than table salt.
Monsanto was furious about this
ruling, so on the same day,
they sent a scathing letter to
the World Health Organization
complaining how this classification
needs to be rectified immediately.
They claimed IARC chose to
disregard dozens of studies,
and that conclusions on
glyphosate must be non-biased,
thorough, and based on quality science.
Soon after, five review papers came out bashing
the IARC classification and
criticizing their decision.
So why would IARC disagree
with all the other agencies,
and why would they ignore so many studies?
Well, this is exactly the question California
lawyer Brent Wisner wanted to answer.
Wisner had been looking into
Monsanto for a while now.
Allegedly, Roundup was causing
a decline in the bee population,
so he thought he could make a case out of it.
But one day, one of Wisner's colleagues
told him that her cousin-in-law had been
using Roundup on his farm for
as long as she could remember,
and then both he and his dog developed
non-Hodgkin's lymphoma, or NHL,
a type of cancer targeting the lymphatic system,
and he died in late 2015.
He didn't stop using it until
he was too weak to do anything.
He didn't think there was any danger with Roundup.
See, the IARC paper that came out saying
glyphosate is a probable carcinogen
actually pointed out that the strongest
evidence was for non-Hodgkin's lymphoma.
And reports of Roundup users getting diagnosed
with NHL were popping up more frequently.
This seemed like more than just a coincidence.
Wisner thought he had a case, but Monsanto was
a corporate giant he couldn't tackle alone,
so he teamed up with other lawyers,
and also an investigative journalist who'd
been reporting on Monsanto for decades.
So there's a lot to write about.
I spent a lot of time at Monsanto headquarters.
It became pretty clear, "This company
really doesn't care about its customers."
Right, okay.
Together, this group of lawyers
started a lawsuit against Monsanto,
and they forced them to hand
over their company documents.
Monsanto had to comply, and
so the lawyers got access to
their internal emails, memos, and safety studies.
Saying one thing publicly and saying
something completely different internally.
The duplicity, the deception,
is just jaw-dropping, really.
In 1983, Monsanto submitted a glyphosate
toxicology study to the EPA
to get it classified as safe,
but the data was showing that mice receiving
higher doses of glyphosate were
developing rare kidney tumors.
The EPA was obviously worried with this,
and they wanted to classify glyphosate
as a possible human carcinogen.
So they asked Monsanto to do more studies.
And Monsanto fought back against that.
"No, you just need to trust
what we're telling you.
You're reading the data
wrong," et cetera et cetera.
Monsanto wouldn't comply, and they
pushed back against the EPA until 1989,
when the EPA suddenly changed its mind.
They said, "A repeat of the mouse oncogenicity
will not be required at this time."
And instead, in 1991, the EPA classified
glyphosate as having evidence of
non-carcinogenicity for humans.
The cancer concern in mice was never made public,
and this new classification
certainly helped push Roundup sales,
at least until more independent research came in.
See, one of the most influential research papers
on Roundup actually came out in the year 2000.
It was the Safety Evaluation and Risk
Assessment of the Herbicide Roundup
and its Active Ingredient Glyphosate for Humans,
commonly just called Williams,
Kroes, and Munro after its authors.
This was the landmark paper on glyphosate safety,
which concluded that Roundup herbicide
does not pose a health risk to humans.
This paper was cited over
1200 times, which is a lot.
And it was considered then by regulators
of the foundational research paper to say
that glyphosate was safe, this independent paper.
Except the paper wasn't independent at all.
See, Monsanto's director of the
toxicology group, William Heydens,
was listed on the paper as someone
who provided scientific support.
So in a 2017 deposition, Wisner and his fellow
lawyers decided to ask Heydens about it.
Were your contributions in your view
to the Williams paper substantial?
No, they were not.
As I said, they were editorial,
just to make it easier to read.
But here's how Heydens referred to his
involvement in the paper internally.
"I have sprouted several new gray hairs
during the writing of this thing,"
or "I'll strangle Kroes or Williams
if they ask for any rewrites!!"
And much later, "We would be keeping
the cost down by us doing the writing
and they would just edit and
sign their names, so to speak.
Recall that is how we handled
Williams Kroes and Munro."
And they celebrated when it was finally done.
You see in their internal documents,
they talk about how this is going to be
our defense, glyphosate around the world.
The patterns of Monsanto's manipulation
were just popping up everywhere.
They tried to change glyphosate cancer
classifications at different agencies.
They seemingly colluded with corrupt EPA
officials to try and kill opposing research.
And they ghost-wrote safety studies.
By mid 2017, Wisner released all of
these internal documents to the public,
now known as the Monsanto Papers.
People were furious.
Newly released docs show Monsanto executives
colluding with corrupted EPA officials.
Would try to influence media and science reports.
Monsanto appears to have been caught red-handed.
We have a paper trail that goes back to the 1980s.
Stakes for Monsanto are extremely high.
Soon, lawyers were overwhelmed
with calls from cancer patients
who used Roundup and got diagnosed with NHL.
They wished to be included in the lawsuit.
By the end of the year, more than
3000 victims had signed onto the case.
But Monsanto tried to do everything
to dismantle these carcinogen claims.
You remember the five independent papers that
came out bashing the IARC decision to
call glyphosate a probable carcinogen?
Well, the main review article
there was ghostwritten by Monsanto.
So you could see this paper getting edited
and changed by people who worked for Monsanto.
And it has been frustrating
to see journals basically
at every step of the way declining to retract.
That paper is still online today,
and Monsanto went all the way to
discredit anyone who is opposing their view
with something called their
'Let Nothing Go' Strategy.
Let Nothing Go is essentially
like, let nothing go.
Somebody tweets online, Roundup
causes cancer, you don't let that go.
You have an onslaught of
people responding to that.
They had whole training operations where
they would bring in nutritionists and
academics and other people to train
them what to say and how to say it.
I do not believe that glyphosate in
Argentina is causing increases in cancer.
You can drink a whole quart
of it and it won't hurt you.
You want to drink some?
We have some here.
I'd be happy to actually.
But not really.
Not really?
I know it wouldn't hurt me.
I mean, if you say so, I have some glyphosate.
No, no, I'm not stupid.
But they very much became
an army that Monsanto could
deploy when a news article came out, for instance.
Are we going to get some comments under this
video that are actually written by Monsanto?
I wouldn't be surprised.
But all of the confusion Monsanto tried
to create around glyphosate wasn't enough.
By the summer of 2018, the truth was out and over
11,000 plaintiffs filed lawsuits against Monsanto.
This was going to destroy them.
But unfortunately, Monsanto had an escape plan.
Just as the first lawsuit
against them was starting,
they signed an acquisition deal
with German chemical giant, Bayer.
Monsanto cashed in, the executives rode off into
the sunset, and Bayer was left holding the bag.
Why would Bayer buy Monsanto?
If it's so obvious that they have hundreds of
thousands of plaintiffs waiting for a verdict,
why would a company do something like that?
Well, I think that's the big question that
the investors are asking, or have asked.
Why in God's name did you do this?
Why did you do this?
I think it was Wall Street
Journal that had a headline,
Worst Acquisition in History,
or something like that.
Bayer stock tanked immediately after the
acquisition, and things only got worse for them.
A few months later, the first case against
the Monsanto-Bayer company went to trial.
The plaintiff was Dewayne Lee Johnson,
who had developed non-Hodgkin lymphoma after
accidentally getting doused with Roundup at work.
The jury faced with evidence from the
Monsanto Papers sided with Johnson,
awarding him $289 million in
damages, and Bayer had to pay up.
By 2025, Bayer had to settle
more than a hundred thousand
cancer lawsuits for the damages
caused by Monsanto's Roundup,
amounting to over $10 billion in settlements.
Monsanto, which is now owned by
Germany's Bayer, denies any wrongdoing.
And they don't accept that Roundup could
have caused the plaintiffs' cancer.
So after all this publicity and scandal,
how dangerous is Roundup really?
My question has always been,
if it doesn't cause cancer and it's not dangerous
and there's no real risk to human health,
why in God's name would Monsanto have to spend
millions and millions and millions of
dollars to create ghostwritten studies,
and hire PR companies to
ghostwrite articles online?
And why would you have to engage in so much
deception if you truly had a safe product, right?
Well, according to IARC, one of the biggest
concerns with glyphosate is genotoxicity.
Some studies have shown that if
you get overexposed to glyphosate,
like many farmers would,
then the chemical might substantially
damage the DNA in your cells,
which is a common mechanism of
action for many carcinogens.
And other studies have actually
pointed to the shikimate pathway.
Again, we don't use it, but
the bacteria in our gut do.
So if you ingest trace amounts of glyphosate,
for example, through your food, it
could disrupt your gut's microbiome.
If you can disrupt the enzyme
in the microflora in your gut,
the EPSP enzyme, the synthase, it
could have all sorts of effects.
Now, IARC never specified at what dose
glyphosate actually becomes dangerous.
Just that overall glyphosate
is a probable carcinogen.
And to put it into context, the other things
in the same classification category are
eating red meat or high temperature
frying or pulling a night shift.
But these are lower than the number one
category, which is a certain carcinogen.
And here of course you have
alcohol and tobacco and sunlight.
And to give you context from our
previous episode on Forever Chemicals,
PFOA was a category one, so a certain carcinogen,
but PFOS is actually a category 2B, which is lower
than glyphosate at only a possible carcinogen.
From the data I've seen, glyphosate doesn't
seem to be a particularly potent carcinogen,
but high exposure to glyphosate
is certainly associated with a
modest increase in your ability
to get certain types of cancers.
And people who have higher exposures
are clearly at higher risk.
Yeah.
However, the EPA and many other organizations
like the European Food Safety Authority still
disagree with the IARC and claim that
glyphosate isn't a likely carcinogen.
But the courts in the United
States have repeatedly told
the EPA that they're not doing a proper analysis,
they're not doing a proper assessment of
glyphosate, they're not following their own rules.
You said something like 50% of the
papers that were about glyphosate
safety and research and toxicity
were probably industry funded.
Yeah, that's just a guess off the top of my head.
Honestly, it could be much higher than 50%.
I certainly do not think it's lower than that.
There's just always a desire by these
companies to control the science.
Today, Bayer still denies that
glyphosate is a carcinogen.
They would still tell you, they don't
think there's anything wrong with it.
When my book came out, Bayer reached
out to me, they sent me an email.
And it was really kind of quite strange.
It was like, "Congratulations.
We've read your book and we've learned
a lot." I think Bayer feels different.
And Bayer actually removed
glyphosate from commercial products.
So this bottle of Roundup here doesn't
even have glyphosate in it anymore.
Part of the reason for that must be
the public backlash and the lawsuits,
but the other reason is that it
doesn't work that well anymore.
We overused glyphosate.
See, since the 1970s, more than 60 species
of weed have become resistant to glyphosate,
just like that first salmonella
sample found near the factory.
What do they put in those Roundup
sprays, if not glyphosate?
Well, mostly full circle, so it's 2,4-D.
Isn't that crazy?
Well, you know, many people will probably go
through life not being affected
in the slightest by glyphosate.
But others may develop cancer or other disease,
and that's why it's really important to
protect the most sensitive individuals.
I think another part of the problem here is how
a company as big as Monsanto
can just infiltrate academia.
They have these big resources so they can just
push around scientists and manipulate results.
They create so much confusion, and
then they just avoid the punishment.
When you don't create firewalls between
the regulated and the regulators,
you have created distrust in science.
Inherently, science is
always going to be political.
It's never going to be disconnected
from the realities of the world,
it's always socially constructed.
But we can do a lot of things to put
rules and regulations in place to try
and make sure that there's a better sense of
independence and disconnection between this.
I want to shout out two books, Carey Gillam's 'The
Monsanto Papers' and Bart Elmore's 'Seed Money'.
They were both incredibly valuable
in researching this topic.
And I also want to shout out people
in the comments of our previous video
on PFAS suggesting that we should cover Monsanto.
Thank you for suggesting that idea.
And thank you as always for watching.